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In July 2017, the IWMI-Tata Water Policy 
Research Program (ITP) launched an action 
research pilot in Monoharpur village of Birbhum 
district. At the heart of the field pilot is the 
hypothesis that tweaking farm power pricing 
policy can boost the local agrarian economy by 
creating pro-poor irrigation service markets. 
After a year of the pilot launch, this highlight, 
which is third in the series, brings results of the 
experiment on variables of interest in the study 
village, reports the challenges faced during 
course of the study and makes recommendation 
for policy change.
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1.  Context
West Bengal is a fairly water-rich state and yet, the farmers 
bear a high irrigation cost owing to expensive farm power. 
Metering of tubewells at high tariff has shaped the irrigation 
services markets to become oligopolistic, putting small and 
marginal water-buying farmers at a disadvantage. T. Shah and 
Chowdhury (2017) proposed that West Bengal can maximise 
the equity benefits of tubewell liberalisation by tweaking its 
electricity pricing policy and collecting a larger proportion of 
the annual cost- to-serve for a tube well connection through 
fixed charges rather than consumption-linked energy tariffs. 
To test this hypothesis, ITP launched a pilot in Monoharpur 
village of Birbhum district where it offered all pump owners 
(irrigation service providers, or ISPs) a subsidy of 70 per cent 
on their monthly bills in excess of the benchmark value set for 
the month, which was nothing but the average of bills of all 
ISPs in corresponding month the previous year. This structure 
was designed to mimic a flat-cum-metered tariff structure, 
with a high flat rate (benchmark calculated) and relatively 
cheaper per unit charges (70 per cent subsidized). This would, 
in our view, encourage ISPs to pump more to maximize gains 
from subsidy and in turn offer their buyers better irrigation 
services at lower prices- affecting not only water but also 
the land leasing market. Details of the study including 
baseline conditions were communicated through the first two 
highlights in this series. A total subsidy amount of ₹1,35,927 
was paid to the ISPs over the course of one year and their 
monthly consumptions recorded. Figure 1 shows the average 
bill of ISPs in 2016-17 (base year) and 2017-18 (study year).
2.  the “Mini-Barga” Disruption
As shown in Table 1, the average area irrigated by ISPs 
actually decreased from 2016-17 to 2017-18 in spite of 
vehement efforts of ISPs to get more buyers and increase 
their pump utilization. In fact, land-leasing market in the 
study year shrunk significantly in the village owing to a 
rumour spread by a local party that Barga Act1  would be 
implemented for all lessees who cultivate on leased land in 
Boro of 2017-18. The fear of losing rights to their own farms 
made many farmers in the area reluctant to lease their land 
out. Some farmers partially cultivated it themselves while 
others left it barren, creating a large impact in the summer 
paddy economy as well as on the ITP pilot. Most water 
buyers did not even lease their land out for rabi crop causing 
rabi area cultivated by water buyers to decline by 98 per 
cent. Some buyers who had committed their lands to ISPs 
took their word back after the ISPs had prepared seedlings 
and the land – making them suffer losses. Few persistent 
ISPs, however, managed to lease-in land from relatives and 
neighbours increasing average area leased in by pump owners 
from 5 bigha in base year to 7 bigha in study year. The rumour 
affected some villages more than others given the leaser-
lessee relationships. Figure 2 shows the total area leased-out 
in entire Monoharpur village and sample in Kendradangal 
village, and the latter’s land leasing market appears to have 
not been affected by the rumour.
1
* This Highlight is based on research carried out under the IWMI-Tata Program (ITP) with additional support from Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research (ICAR), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE). 
It is not externally peer-reviewed and the views expressed are of the author/s alone and not of ITP or its funding partners.
† Corresponding author: Manisha Shah [m.shah@cgiar.org].
1Operation Barga, the land reform movement introduced by the erstwhile Left Front government in 1978, had recorded the names of sharecrop-
pers (bargadars), giving them legal protection against eviction by the landlords and entitling them to a share of the produce. It was also made an 
inheritable right.
Figure 2: Leased-out area (bigha) in both villages









































Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
2016-17 2017-18
Water Policy Research Highlight-05
3.  Water Markets anD ‘stiCky’ priCes
At the baseline, we determined that the W/AC multiple of the 
village was much higher than 1 i.e. the water prices charged 
by ISPs (W) was greater than average cost of service delivery 
(AC) that ISPs incurred. Data showed that ISPs were billed for 
an average power consumption of 3,503 units, which roughly 
translates to ₹16,000 which, added to their annual average 
maintenance cost, provided us with an estimate of their cost 
of service delivery. Table 1 shows comparison between W/
AC multiple for Boro season (December – April) of base year 
(2016-17) and study year  (2017-18). Table 1 shows how ISPs, 
Table 1: Comparison of W/AC multiple in base and study years
Parameter 2016-17 2017-18
Average units of power consumed (kWh) 3,503 4,588
Cost of power at ₹5.18/unit1 ₹18,146 ₹23,765
Average pump maintenance cost in Boro season ₹5,156 ₹3,495
Operating cost (Rs 3000/month) ₹15,000 ₹15,000
Total cost of service delivery over 5 months ₹38,300 ₹42,260
Area irrigated by one pump (bigha) 25 24.5
Break-even price for ISPs (for buyers’ area irrigated) ₹1,532 ₹1,724
Actual price charged by ISPs (ISP-reported) ₹1,526 ₹1,740
Actual price charged by ISPs (water buyer-reported) ₹1,614 ₹1,798
W/AC multiple 1.05 1.04
Profit percentage for ISPs (at buyer-reported prices) 5.35 % 4.29 %
Average subsidy received by an ISP under the pilot NA ₹7,970
Profit after addition of subsidy provided by ITP NA 5.71 %
Savings on irrigating own land ₹7,737 ₹10,059
Profit after accounting for savings 25.5 % 28.05 %
1calculated based on time-based consumption pattern of ISPs of 
Monoharpur in base year
Table 2: Units estimated and actually billed
2016-17 2017-18
Area of water buyers irrigated by one pump (bigha) 25 24.5
ISPs own area irrigated by the pump (bigha) 11 14.3
Average pump running hours (area irrigated*282 as 
reported by ISPs)
1008 1086.4
Power consumed by 6.5 HP pump for given hours 4,888 5,269
Units consumed at 75 % efficiency 6501 7,008
Percentage of actual consumption billed 53.9 % 65.5 %
2 on an average, 28 hours of irrigation is needed for one bigha of Boro 
paddy
2
in spite of the subsidy given under the pilot, could barely 
make the same profit by selling water as last time. This 
also highlights the fact that ISPs are earning merely 5 per 
cent more by selling water, that too without accounting 
for fixed costs averaging ₹88,000 which they pay during 
pump installation (Shah et al. 2017b). They, however, save 
substantially on irrigating their own land, which is almost 
half of their total irrigated area, which balances out the fixed 
cost component. Only the power cost of irrigating one bigha 
of land for Boro paddy cultivation is around ₹704, so the 
additional ₹1,000 approximately charged by ISPs is actually 
not just to cover their operating cost but to cross-subsidize 
their own irrigation costs. Even with operating expenses at 40 
per cent, ISPs are making 80 per cent profit for every bigha of 
land irrigated in Boro season.
In Table 1, we also see how the average units consumed 
by each pump has increased by 31 per cent while the area 
serviced by ISPs remains almost the same. There are two 
apparent reasons for this inconsistency. Firstly, the utility has 
been in the process of replacing all overhead low-tension 
transmission cables in the area to tamper-proof insulated 
cables under its ₹1,000 crore project to prevent physical 
pilferage (ToI 2017). In this process, most of the ISPs who 
ran their pumps on stolen power could not do so this year 
and hence, their recorded power consumption has shot 
up drastically even though their actual area has not. Table 
2 shows the calculated units that the pumps would have 
actually consumed in irrigating the area reported during 
primary survey and the impact of reduced power theft on 
total consumption billed is also apparent. 
Secondly, the higher pump utilization can also be attributed 
to ISPs wanting to accumulate benefits of subsidy at 
their level by filling their farm ponds for aquaculture, and 
expanding their own rabi and Boro area using subsidized 
power. Ten out of twenty ISPs reported filling of farm ponds 
this year with their pumps. Data reveals that in total, ISPs’ 
own Boro area has increased by 37.5 per cent in 2018 
compared to 2017 while their rabi area has almost tripled. 
The calculations in Table 2 have ignored utilization of pumps 
for filling farm ponds by ISPs due to large variation in pump 
usage across ISPs for this activity; and on an average is 
not as significant as power consumed in irrigating paddy. 
Chowdhury (2018) reported that number of hours of 
pumping for filling farm ponds ranged between 24 to 160 
approximately (i.e. 150 to 1,000 units), which averaging to 
500 units is only 10 per cent of total power billed.
Unlike the common practice of ISPs declaring their water 
prices ahead of the season, farmers in the study village  only 
know their irrigation cost at the end of the season. All farm 
connections in West Bengal are metered with monthly 
billing cycle but due to high cost of meter reading, the utility 
generates bills for some average consumption and ISPs know 
their actual bill only at the end of season when the utility 
sets camps for bill collection (Shah et al. 2017b). This is also 
one of the reasons why the ISPs feared if they will be able 
to cross the power consumption benchmark set in the pilot. 
During multiple group discussions held in the course of the 
study, ISPs always claimed they had pumped as much as 
their fellow ISPs and yet, their bill was much lower reducing 
their confidence to rely on the power subsidy. Issues with 
billing is a major reason why ISPs cannot set a price for 
irrigation services at the start of the season. Also, they learn 
of penalty charged due to delays in payment only during the 
bill payment camp organized twice a year to collect payment 
from pump owners, which has to be added to their total 
cost of irrigation services. Additionally, all ISPs of the area 
(including three adjacent villages) decide on a common price 
which is the price set by ISPs of Jadhavpur village nearby, 
with little room for negotiation from water buyers.
Table 3: Calculation of water selling profit margin in Amon season
No. of unit consumed in irrigating 1 bigha (kWh) 14.55
Units actually consumed (after efficiency adjustment) 19.4
Amount billed for units consumed ₹ 100.25
Operating expenses (40 % of power cost as estimated from 
Table 1)
₹ 40
Actual amount charged from water buyers ₹ 600
Profit margin for every bigha irrigated ₹ 460
Average Amon season profit per ISP in 2016 (Average area= 25 
bigha)
₹ 11,500
Average Amon season profit per ISP in 2017 (Average area= 6 
bigha)
₹ 2,760
4.  Failure to Create CoMpetition
Chowdhury (2015) reported that ISPs felt that the business 
of selling water is not as profitable as it appears not only due 
to high cost of power but due to other reasons too. At the 
commencement of the pilot, Shah et al. (2017a) hypothesized 
that rational behaviour of ISPs will drive them to maximize 
2  HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the 
market and then summing the resulting numbers. HHI < 100 indicates perfect competition, 100<HHI<1000 indicates monopolistic competition 
and HHI>1000 indicates oligopolistic competition.
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(see Figure 3) in both Amon and Boro seasons as the  
 factors that influenced price rise in Monoharpur also affected 
Kendradangal farmers.  The rise was lower in Kendradangal 
which could be due to canal water that was made available in 
some fields of the village.
Boro water prices are also closely linked to kharif season 
water prices. T. Shah and Chowdhury (2017) pointed out that 
many ISPs only provide Amon irrigation if the water buyer 
agrees to lease-out a portion of their land to them during 
Boro. The price that water buyers have to pay in Amon, 
otherwise, is much higher i.e. ₹600 for 2-3 hours of irrigation 
(on account of delayed or low rainfall) per bigha. It is in Amon 
that ISPs earn a hefty profit by selling water to small and 
marginal farmers. In Table 3, calculations show that compared 
to 2016, fewer water buyers demanded protective irrigation 
in 2017 for their kharif paddy, hence, ISPs again couldn’t 
lower Boro water prices as they had to make up for losses 
in Amon. Kendradangal village in the same block, which was 
selected as a control village also recorded an increase in price 
their gains from subsidy and hence, create a sense of 
competition, eventually lowering the price for benefit of 
water buyers. However, at the end of one year, the prices 
have only increased. Two of the most important reasons as 
explained in the section above i.e. reduced ability to pilfer 
power and decrease in area due to the ‘mini-barga’ rumour in 
addition to low irrigation demand in kharif paddy. However, 
if we assume that none of these disruptions had actually 
come into play, would the ISPs be motivated to lower prices? 
Several interviews conducted over the course of one year 
with the ISPs suggest that the answer is “NO”. Chowdhury 
(2018) lists reasons for this:
  The ISPs of the area have an informal institution for price 
setting and pump owners who own 5-6 pumps in the 
area, across villages, generally dictate prices as it suits 
them. The group knows that they will benefit by sticking 
together keeping their profits on the higher side.
  The ISPs understood that the subsidy under pilot 
would only last a year or maybe two but it was not 
forever, neither did they see any such tariff change 
implementation by the utility in near future. Lowering 
prices to attract water buyers of a fellow ISP would 
project them in a bad light in their group and their gains 
from sticking to the group over many years is much 
higher than what they would earn by expanding their 
command area for one year under the pilot.
  Lowering prices this year opens them up for negotiation 
and pressure from buyers next year, which they cannot 
allow to happen as they might incur losses due to the 
high power bills.
  One of the major issues that ISPs face is timely collection 
of payment from buyers who being small farmers, often 
cannot pay during a bad crop season (Shah et al. 2017b) 
and the transaction cost involved in the collection 
process is high. ISPs who did lower water price for a 
few water buyers only did it as buyers paid an advance 
upfront so their future transaction cost was reduced.
  Purchasing a pump and getting connection requires a 
substantial investment, which was even higher a decade 
ago. No ISP would invest in one without guaranteed 
command area for selling water. The ISPs have an 
informal agreement to not encroach into each others’ 
designated area set during pump installation. 
  Many ISPs also own other agriculture equipment like 
tractor, thresher, etc. which gives them more power 
over their water buyers, who require these machines in 
addition to irrigation services- mostly all at credit till they 
sell off the produce or in exchange for crop.
Chowdhury (2018) also reports that there are cases when a 
water buyer requests an ISP for their services when they have 
dispute on any matter with their former ISP. The new ISP, 
however, starts selling water only after a gap of one season to 
ensure that they don’t damage relationship with fellow ISPs.
5.  the Brighter siDe oF things
Prima facie evidence based on data suggested that the 
experiment hadn’t in fact been able to change the irrigation 
services market of Monoharpur at all. However, Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI)2 used to quantify market share of 
each pump owner at baseline and then at the end of the 
experiment in Monoharpur irrigation services market shows 
a slight shift in market characteristics. Not only has the 
total irrigated area of the water buyers (in either or both 
seasons) increased by 8.7 per cent, the HHI of the market has 
decreased by 66 points i.e. the market has moved towards 
being more competitive (Figure 4). This indicates that in spite 
of increase in price of water, market share of individual ISPs 
moved closer to each other and the average market share of 
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Figure 4: Total area irrigated in Monoharpur and HHI indicator
5.1.  Market Share of ISPs
Figure 5 shows the market share of each ISP in 2016-17 and 
2017-18 based on data aggregated from 279 water buyers. It 
is clearly evident from the figure that ISPs with lower market 
share tried to increase their area covered by pumps while the 
opposite happened with ISPs who had larger command area 
earlier. Five water buyers reported having purchased water 
from a new ISP this year which suggests that ISPs have been 
trying to get new water buyers but did not want to report it.
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Figure 5: Market share of each ISP in base and study year
5.2.  Quality of Irrigation Services
The HHI calculated earlier indicated that the irrigation 
services market of Monoharpur lies in the zone of 
monopolistic competition i.e. buyers try to differentiate their 
product/ service. Being service providers, one way for ISPs to 
differentiate themselves is through better service. The water 
buyers were asked to rate the irrigation services they receive 
4
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on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being poor and 5 being excellent. 
Average rating of services in 616 plots of water buyers is 
shown in Figure 6. The ISPs have actually improved their 
service over last year which is an indicator of change in their 
behaviour towards water buyers as customers. To ensure 
that their buyer doesn’t switch to another ISP, apart from 
ensuring meeting water needs of buyers as timely as possible, 
they provided additional services such as channelling water 
through furrows and pipes themselves without water buyers 
having to be present in the field, providing discounts for 
advance payments, or willing to wait for payment until paddy 
prices are higher so that the buyer doesn’t have to sell-off 
their harvest at lower prices under pressure to pay. While 
water buyers might not have gained directly through reduced 
irrigation cost, they have benefitted through better services 
which also impacts their productivity and income. 
5.3.  Competition-Quality Correlation
To determine whether ISPs faced a threat of losing water 
buyers to another ISP who can service the same plot, 
correlation tests were run between total water sellers 
available in a plot and quality of irrigation services (rated by 
buyers on a scale of 1 to 5). The number of water sellers and 
quality of services exhibited weak negative correlation in 
2011, very small positive correlation in 2016-17 and stronger 
positive correlation in 2017-18 – the study year (see Figure 
7). It is clear that before receiving subsidized power, the 
threat of losing their water buyers to another seller who can 
access a plot was non-existent whereas with heightened 
sense of competition amongst ISPs while receiving subsidized 
power made them strive towards providing better services 
to their buyers. Had it not been for the disruptions, it can be 
easily inferred that ISPs who made tremendous advancement 
in their service quality would also have found ways to offer 
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Figure 7: Change in correlation between extent of competition and 










Figure 8: Strategies of ISPs to maximize their benefit from subsidy  
(% of total strategies)
7.  other Market inDiCators
During baseline, 98 per cent water buyers had reported that 
they found it easy to meet their irrigation demand and the 
same number had reported utmost difficulty in negotiating 
water prices. While the number of water buyers who could 
negotiate prices during subsidy regime only increased 
marginally with 1 per cent of them actually negotiating lower 
rates, almost all (99.6 per cent) buyers reported their water 
demands were met very easily this year. This supports the 
earlier argument that increased competition sense amongst 
ISPs has ensured timely services to water buyers. 
During FGDs, almost all ISPs had mentioned that they 
faced no difficulty to get water buyers at baseline but at 
end-line, 35 per cent of them reported difficulty in getting 
water buyers. 42 per cent of them also reported difficulty in 
sticking to the set prices due to negotiation by water buyers. 
They also reported preferring cash after harvest as a better 
payment system compared to leasing-in land.
8.  proposal For a “pro-poor” poliCy Change 
At baseline, ISPs were asked whether they preferred flat over 
low-tariff metered connection and majority of them preferred 
the latter. Most ISPs could also run their pumps on pilfered 
power then. Now, even with tamper-proof overhead cables, 
ISPs still prefer a low-tariff metered connection over flat. This 
is mainly because they are worried about losing control on the 
price of water, which would happen if utilities started levying 
annual flat charges thereby increasing competition amongst 
ISPs and thereby empowering buyers to negotiate rates till 
W/AC multiple moved close to 1. Figure 9 shows responses 
of ISPs to factors that would motivate them to pump and sell 
more water to their buyers. 
High power bills continue to plague the ISPs year after other, 
especially when they pay hefty penalties on late payment. 
Outstanding bills of five ISPs and corresponding LPSC (Late 
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Payment Surcharge) are listed in Table 4. On an average, the 
ISPs have been paying 15-30 per cent of their bill amount as 
late payment penalties. 
In the second highlight, Shah et al. (2017b) reported that the 
utility bears ₹ 15 for every meter reading ever month and 
it is a common knowledge in the state that paddy farmers 
pay their bills only after selling-off their harvest at the end of 
season. Hence, it makes more sense for the utility to charge 
farmers seasonally rather than monthly which not only saves 
their transaction costs but also reduces penalties that ISPs 
have to pay which they in-turn levy from water buyers leaving 
them worse-off. Figure 10 shows that 14 out of 20 ISPs 
pay their bills only seasonally, which further supports the 
argument made. 
M. Shah and Chowdhury (2017) reported based on their 
exploration of Boro paddy situation in the state multiple 
instances of villages where farmers had given up on Boro 
paddy cultivation altogether due to severed electricity 
connection as they were unable to pay bills and accumulated 
large penalties. Small and marginal farmers, for whom Boro 
paddy is prime to food security have been forced to migrate 
for work. The non-paying consumers become non-performing 
assets for the utility and add to their losses. The utility incurs 
₹ 4.84 for an average unit of power sold but earns only ₹4.07 
per unit from farm consumers (PFC 2016). When temporary 
connection for Boro were more prevalent in the state,  
farmers paid an advance deposit upfront to the utility which 
was adjusted based on their final metered consumption. 
The pump owners as well as water buyers enjoyed cheaper 
irrigation services then. A similar model can be used by the 
utility to mitigate issues of NPA and at the same time benefit 
small farmers. 












better prices to their buyers. Irrespective of the prices, they 
would have been tempted to lease-in more land to gain more 
from subsidy, which in-turn would increase the leasing-prices 
in the village.
6.  suBsiDy MaxiMizing strategies 
Figure 8 shows that amongst the strategies used by ISPs 
to maximize subsidy gains, expanding their own area either 
by leasing-in land when possible or their cropping intensity 
comprises of the biggest chunk. Some ISPs increased their 
Boro area either by irrigating some unirrigated highland 
with pipe or areas in adjacent villages. Others tried to 
utilise subsidy by increasing rabi area or attempted growing 
vegetables where Boro paddy cultivation was not possible. 
Also, digging and filling farm ponds as explained earlier was 
another major strategy especially in months when subsidy 
kick-off point was lower. Many ISPs also reported that they 
did not have any scope to increase their area and hence, 
couldn’t change their pumping behaviour to maximize subsidy 
gains. None of the ISPs switched to hourly pricing system 
and given that leasing-in land was difficult due to the Barga 
Act rumour, many of them offered their services for payment 
after harvesting.












Table 5: Proposed tariff structure
Flat charges in Kharif season (June-November) ₹ 2,500
Units covered under flat tariff in Kharif 500
Flat charges in Boro season (December-May) ₹ 20,000
Units covered under flat tariff in Boro 4,000
Assured annual revenue for utility per connection ₹ 22,500
Per unit charge beyond covered units ₹ 5.10
Revenue from an ISP at Monoharpur at current consumption rate ₹ 40,350
Savings in metering cost  (from 12 times to twice a year) 83.4 %
6
Water Policy Research Highlight-05

















Based on data collected during the pilot, it is apparent 
that all ISPs are mostly medium or large farmers with at 
least 10 bigha of land, irrigating which in Boro requires 
approximately 1,400 units of power using a 6.5 HP pump 
i.e. for approximately 30 per cent of total pump usage as per 
Mukherji et al. (2009). If the utility were to charge them a flat 
fee of  ₹20,000 for first 4,000 units consumed in boro season 
paid in advance at the beginning of the season, they would 
still recover their cost of supply with a small positive margin 
Similar computation can be done for kharif paddy  All units 
consumed in excess can be charged at ₹5.10 per kWh - giving 
utility a 5 per cent margin on every unit sold. Currently, the 
utility earns an average revenue of ₹16,405 from each farm 
connection and it spends ₹7 crores on reading its 3 lakh plus 
metered connections annually. Table 5 computes its revenue 
per pump if it follows a flat-cum-metered tariff structure.
The flat-cum-metered tariff structure is definitely a win - 
win situation for the major stakeholders involved, probably 
except for the ISPs, who would benefit more if advance flat 
payment was linked to subsidized per unit charges on excess 
consumption. ISPs might not find a lot of difference in their 
consumed energy charges but reduced uncertainty and no 
LPSC would mean much lower bills at the end of season. The 
benefits to each of them have been listed in Table 6. Actual 
slabs for both seasons could vary across districts based on 
the cropping pattern but for the paddy growing districts 
(18 of 23), majority of whose cultivated area is occupied by 
paddy, these calculations are likely to hold true.
Stakeholder Benefits
Utility
• Assured annual revenue of at least ₹ 22,500 (37% higher than existing) from every active farm connection
• Reduced cost of meter reading
• Reduction in number of non-performing assets and risk of non-payment by agricultural consumers
Irrigation Pump 
Owners
• Lowered uncertainty of bill amount and hence, lowered accumulated penalties on late payment
• Advance collection of water charges from buyers to pay the flat portion of tariff reducing future transaction costs
• Increased motivation to expand area and efficiency of irrigation till 500 units in amon and 4,000 in boro are consumed
• Ease of setting prices early in the season to attract more water buyers
• Expansion of aquaculture and rabi/boro area without getting bogged down by peak-time charges
Water Buyers
• Increased bargaining power as ISP has to depend on them to collect money for advance payment to utility (else might end up losing 
connection for the season)
• Heightened ability to negotiate prices (especially in amon when ISPs have to at least ensure consumption of  500 units)
• Avail better land leasing rates knowing that ISPs have more pressure to increase their command area under flat-cum-metered tariff
• Improved irrigation services quality offered by ISPs
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Table 6: Benefits of flat-cum-metered tariff structure to different stakeholders
The IWMI-Tata Water Policy Program (ITP) was launched in  
2000 as a co-equal partnership between the International  
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of research done in India on water resource management. Its  
objective is to help policy makers at the central, state and local  
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